There is a long history of fierce and effective resistance to colonial influence in the Arabian Gulf. The region is almost unique, for instance, in maintaining a considerable degree of independence from European imperial powers which by 1914, according to Edward Said, controlled up to 85% of the earth (1993b, p.1). However, according to Alnasrawi (1991) and other contemporary observers, the Gulf today has been reduced to a position of ‘dependency’ on the west. This dependency takes many forms, and is maintained in a number of ways. For mass communications scholars working within the political economy tradition, the role of transnational media flows are paramount in maintaining centre-periphery relations of dependency and compliance. Smith (1980) argues that:

‘The threat to independence in the late twentieth century from the new electronics could be greater than was colonialism itself. We are beginning to learn that de-colonisation and the growth of supra-nationalism were not the termination of imperial relationships but merely the extending of a geopolitical web which has been spinning since the Renaissance. The new media have the power to penetrate more deeply into a ‘receiving’ culture than any previous manifestation of western technology. The results could be immense havoc, an intensification of the social contradictions within developing societies today.’ (p.176)

Nevertheless, this media and cultural imperialism thesis has not passed unchallenged within mass communications theory. Ien Ang (1991, 1995), Michael Tracey (1985) and David Morley (1986) are three critics who have challenged the totalising influence ascribed to western media exports. This revision of political economy analysis, usually offered within the cultural studies tradition, has two major strands. Firstly, it suggests that media flows are no longer uni-directional and that vibrant and popular media production in a number of countries (India, Egypt, Brazil for example) offers a significant challenge to the west’s traditional dominance. Secondly, that audiences both within and outside the west are not ‘cultural dopes’; that audience ‘resistance’ to, and ‘reworking’ of (western, capitalist) media messages occurs in a number of ways, so that nations, communities and indigenous cultures are far less ‘fragile’ or ‘vulnerable’ than we might think.

There are still relatively few studies of the competing claims of political economy and cultural studies in relation to the media and cultural imperialism thesis amongst ‘non-western’ audiences. The reasons for this are beyond the scope of this paper, but may partly lie with the location of most critical media and communications courses in western educational institutes.

They may also be because determining ‘media effects’ is notoriously problematic, if not impossible. Similarly, ‘resistance’ to the preferred meanings of a given media text is easily shown when the reader is a cultural critic of the calibre of John Fiske, but not so easy to demonstrate amongst ‘ordinary’ audiences.

This paper does not attempt to take sides on the debate over the cultural and media imperialism thesis, but to find out what Gulf Arabs themselves have to say about their daily encounters with western media. I have focussed particularly, though not exclusively, on Hollywood films. This is because, from my research, it seems clear that of all the media available, it is American movies - shown at the cinema, on video and on satellite and terrestrial television – that are by far the most popular western media product with Arab audiences.

The regional/ethnic focus of investigation is important because it is one that is quite under-researched (Sreberny, 1999). Why should this be so? The culture, language, traditions, attitudes, lifestyles and beliefs of Arabic people (both in the Gulf and beyond) are largely perceived in highly stereotypical, simplistic and often antagonistic terms in 'western' popular thought (1). This tendency is a driving force behind ‘Orientalism’, which Said (1978) and Sardar (1994) have shown to be a deep-rooted, pernicious and destructive feature of western cultural and intellectual life (2). This situation is exacerbated by a number of highly divergent 'core beliefs' that apparently divide the 'west' from the 'middle-east', based, at least in part, on religious doctrines and political histories (see Tibi 1995, Masoud 1999). Therefore, communication research of this kind might be thought of as useful, in a wider sense, by bringing the two regions closer together in understanding, reducing tensions, defusing resentments, avoiding conflicts and helping to inform future media policies. However, the divergent ‘worldview’ of Arabic culture and western culture (see Haque, 1997, p.18), coupled with the 'closed' nature of the Gulf's political structures, social or educational institutions and family/tribal groups has made close academic studies of this kind very difficult.

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