A brief sketch of key social, historical, political and economic facts relating to the region in which the study was conducted will help to contextualise the research findings. It may also help to account for what Crocetti (1996) refers to as the ‘almost completely hidden’ nature of the culture and society - as it should be understood that Gulf countries do not easily open themselves for western investigation.

Despite the general impression that the Arabian Gulf is one geographical entity representing one race, religion, language and culture, the reality of it is that the region is a mosaic of populations, which speak different languages and come from different ethnic backgrounds. There are huge expatriate populations from throughout North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Europe and North America working in the Gulf. In several of the countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, expatriates make up an overwhelming majority of the population. Aside from this, even amongst indigenous peoples of the area there is substantial diversity. The Jebali peoples of Yemen and southern Oman, for example have a language and culture that is quite alien to the Arabs of Saudi Arabia or Qatar.

Even amongst the Arab people of the region, who are the focus of this study, there are some considerable differences. An Arab from Kuwait, for instance, will have distinctive clothing, dialect, and religious practices (Sunni Muslim) than an Arab from the Sultanate of Oman (Ibadhi Muslim). Differences extend to cultural, political and economic life, with quite spectacular contrasts being offered between ultra-conservative Riyadh in Saudi Arabia (where western women must wear head scarves and cannot drive) and Dubai in the UAE, where mini-skirts are a regular fashion item and pubs and night-clubs are taken for granted. Nevertheless, in terms of language, religion and culture, the Arabs of the Gulf countries have far more in common than separates them. There is no real language barrier between the various countries of the Gulf; customs and etiquette at a domestic level vary little between the Arab people and Islam is a common touchstone of identity. To this extent, the research on Hollywood and ‘Arab identity’ that I have conducted in two countries (Oman and the UAE) may be indicative, at a very general level, of attitudes across the Gulf region. The people interviewed in the towns of Ibri and Al Ain (where the study was carried out) also, I believe, offer a broad balance of opinion between the more ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ cultures of the Arabian Gulf. Clearly, therefore, while I am keen to avoid the dangers of extrapolating from the specific to the general, I believe this research may provide a ‘starting point’ for mass communications researchers posing questions about Arab audiences in the Gulf region.

Oman and the UAE are located on the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula, an area inhabited since the third millennium BC. Its inhabitants were converted to Islam during the 7^th century while Muhammed was still alive, and the religion was a powerful unifying force amongst the tribespeople engaged in agriculture, fishing and pearl diving and also amongst the nomadic Bedouin. The first European intruders into the region were the Portuguese in the 16^th century, followed in the succeeding century by the Dutch, British, French and Iranians who vied for control of the coastal areas in particular (Encarta 1999).

The 19^th and 20th centuries saw the formation of nations in the Middle East from what had been scattered provinces ruled largely by tribes or foreign governors:

‘Borders were often loosely defined, and allegiances makeshift. When borders were defined, they were likely to be done so by the colonial powers at the stroke of a pen. The system of protectorates was introduced at the beginning of the 20th century in order to carve up the Middle East into areas of influence among the colonial powers notably Britain, France and Germany.’ (Interlink, 1994, p.54)

As the UAE Yearbook of 1996 explains, this was part of a similar series of agreements with other Gulf states, for which there were no immediate parallels anywhere else in the world. This official document describes Britain’s role in interesting terms:

‘To some extent, indeed, the relationship of Britain with the emirates, apart from matters of foreign affairs and defence, can best be described as one of benign neglect. Until the mid-1950s, virtually no attention was paid by the British to the economic development of the country, and even then, it was the rulers themselves who took the initiative in creating a modern infrastructure.’ (p.29)

Britain’s involvement in the affairs of Oman, which had become almost hermetically sealed from the outside world since 1932, became more direct from 1970. In that year the current Sultan Qaboos bin Said overthrew his father in a palace coup. Qaboos, who had trained at Sandhurst as an officer and who had been virtually imprisoned by his father on his return, was helped by the British to eliminate resistance to his rule by dissident tribes and Marxist rebels in the Dhofar region. The new ruler liberalized the regime and dramatically increased spending on development, which, under his father’s reign, had been virtually non-existent.

The United Arab Emirates was formed by the rulers of seven emirates in 1971 after Britain announced the termination of its agreement with the Trucial States. The oil industry saw the transformation of the UAE from a string of tiny impoverished principalities to a regional, and increasingly international, economic power in barely a quarter of a century. The UAE has a production capacity of 2.5-million barrel day: in the same league as Russia or the North Sea, but with a total population of less than three million (at least 75% of whom are expatriates).(Interlink, 1998). The Sultanate of Oman has also experienced staggeringly swift development since 1970 although its oil production capacity is on a much smaller scale. Furthermore, the country has a population of around 2.5 million of which the majority is Omani. Hence Omanis, on the whole, are not as wealthy as their Emirati neighbours.

The research in this dissertation was carried out while working as an English language teacher in state run colleges in the towns of Ibri in Oman, and Al Ain in the United Arab Emirates. Al Ain and Ibri are only an hour and a half’s drive apart and nationals in both countries can travel freely across the border without visas. Both towns are growing rapidly despite being located far from the coast in hostile desert landscapes. Formerly small but important oasis towns on the inland trade routes between Muscat and Dubai or Abu Dhabi they now both sustain populations of over 100,000 people. Ibri is a remote town, an hour and a half’s drive from the nearest sizeable town, and more than three hours from Muscat, the capital. While working at the Women’s College of Education (a teacher training institution) in Ibri until June 1999 I was able to conduct a limited number of interviews and questionnaires with the students (an activity officially frowned on by the Ministry of Higher Education for political reasons). I was also able to acquire a substantial collection of rental records from a local video shop, which allows me to ‘triangulate’ my reception study with a snapshot content analysis of local viewing habits.

In Al Ain, at the Men’s Higher College of Technology I was able to further the research and provide (with a smaller study conducted at the Women’s College of Technology) a complementary series of interviews and questionnaires. Taken together the information collected in Ibri and Al Ain offers a glimpse of the complexities of audience attitudes to, and uses of western media products amongst Gulf Arabs of a certain age group and level of education. It was fascinating, if often frustrating to be conducting the research in an area with exceptionally few comparable precedents. The results will, I believe, provide a ‘pilot study’ on this important topic.