There is a considerable body of knowledge, at a general level, relating to media impacts in a ‘foreign’ or ‘global context’. However, actual investigation of media use amongst non-western audiences seldom occurs, with ‘anecdotal or circumstantial evidence’ usually offered (Lealand quoted by Tracey, 1985, p.355) This is particularly the case in the Gulf countries, and is as much a concern to media industries as it is to mass communication scholarship. Sreberny (1999) argues that the entire Middle East is still understood through the disciplinary optics of geo-strategic interests, the political economy of oil rent and Islam:

‘Yet the region is undergoing profound and rapid change in its media environment and in popular access to information technologies. New communications technologies and means of distribution, new producers and new audiences make the region one of the liveliest mediated cultures around, with profound implications for its politics and culture.’ (p.1)

Mowlana (1995) describes the impact of European media on the Middle East in terms of ‘technology’ and ‘content’. A large number of cultural and media imperialism studies referred to by Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996, p.179) have shown, not only a continuing imbalance in information flows from the west to ‘developing countries’, but domination and influence on domestic product in terms of production values, genres, formats, ideologies, languages, national focus and cultural values. Evidence of domination has been found in relation to the west’s trade with the Middle East. Objective, empirical evidence of actual cultural erosion, or skewing of domestic media production as a result of western media flows is, of course, more difficult to provide. Such a case has been made, in general terms, by (Dowmunt (1993), Boyd-Barrett (1996), Fox (1995), Frederick (1995), Nyamnjoh (1998) but it is not uncontested and has been given a more qualified description by Hannerz (1989) and others.

A political economy analysis of Hollywood’s influence in the Gulf will take into consideration developments in both Arab and non-Arab terrestrial and satellite television, arguably, the most important delivery vehicle for western films. Furthermore, relevant information regarding local developments in video and cinema distribution must also be considered.

According to Forrester (1999) the Middle East is considered a growing market, as well as an important centre of production of Arabic language broadcasts and film, amongst media industry personnel (5). Contradictory forces, however, are also at work. Showtime, a major satellite competitor boasts in its advertising campaigns that it offers ‘The best in western entertainment’. Showtime is a joint venture of the Kuwaiti Investments Projects Company (Kipco) - with close connections to the Kuwaiti Royal Family - and Viacom, the American broadcasting giant. CEO of Kipco Faisal Al-Ayyar explains why Showtime has deliberately ‘steered clear’ of Arabic programming’:

‘The reason for staying with western material is not so well understood. For example take movies. The total library of Egyptian movies, since inception, is about 6,000 films. If you have 25 or so free-to-air channels, each showing a movie a day then you will quickly see every one of those movies. The trouble is not all have stood the test of time, which means you can see the good ones very frequently, and this is what’s happening here. Which is why we decided to stay with western programming where high-quality programming is plentiful.’ (quoted in Forrester, January 2000, p.49)

Nevertheless, Showtime is careful to subtitle all of its output and it offers around 40 commonly available free-to-air, terrestrial Arabic language channels through its digital, satellite delivery service. Accurate figures for the expansion of media organisations in the region are difficult to come by, but it is estimated that there were 6.96 million TV households in the Gulf in 1999, compared to 4.77 million only four years ago (Baskerville Communications Corp.1999). Of these there are also growing numbers subscribing to satellite packages such as Orbit and Showtime, although these platforms are still relatively ‘young’ (Orbit the largest pay network has only 400,000 viewing points in the Middle East according to Forrester (2000)) Cinema complexes are another booming media phenomenon in the Gulf. The entertainment group Primedia is opening a chain of new cinemas in the United Arab Emirates, amongst other countries which, according to a company spokesman:

‘presented rich opportunities either because they were emerging economies with enormous potential media growth or mature markets offering prospects for expansion in emerging or fast-growth media’ (Parker, 1998, p.1)

A key element to western media interests’ success in the area has been the recent co-operation of Gulf countries in implementing international copyright treaties. For some countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, this has been implemented ‘for real this time’ since 1994 (Crocetti); while the Sultanate of Oman (keen to gain admittance to the WTO) has only enforced copyright laws in earnest since 1998. This has meant that pirated video copies can only be obtained ‘under the counter’ from particular retailers, where before they were openly available in all video stores. Consequently, profits from video, video-CD and DVD sales for the Hollywood studios have risen dramatically, while pirate editions of the latest Hollywood blockbusters become harder to obtain (6).

A political economy analysis of western media influence in the Gulf should also trace the involvement of foreign interests in the establishment of related media infrastructures (such as television) in the region. Abdellatif Aloofy (1998) has produced one of the few detailed studies of Gulf television. The report includes an historical overview of the medium’s development as well as a substantial content analysis to determine the volume, origin and type of programmes that are broadcast by Gulf satellite channels. He states that ‘with the exception of Qatar, television services in the Gulf were started by Western companies and individuals’ (p.38). He goes on to show how by the late 1970s most television stations were under national control, where they were used for ‘development and support of the government’ (p.43).

In what Aloofy describes as a ‘second phase of development’, from 1960-89 Gulf states developed extensive domestic terrestrial networks and began to make use of satellite transmissions, the first in 1978 by Saudi Arabia - a country that came to dominate the region through the 1980s. Aloofy explains how the wide use of satellite dishes became more popular at the end of the Gulf War. In 1994 Saudi Arabia banned the importation or production of satellite dishes, organising cable transmission to viewers of the kingdom ‘in adherence to the religious and moral values of the country’ (p.49). Today all of the major terrestrial Gulf channels are available as both analogue and digital transmissions from satellites such as Arabsat and Nilesat.

For the majority of Arab households it is these ‘free-to-air’ satellite services which are most popular. CNN, the station that, arguably, spurred massive interest in satellite TV in the region during the Gulf War is the only ‘western’ station available on these predominantly Arabic language platforms. The free-to-air services available from Asiasat, which carries BBC World, MTV Asia and a number of South Asian stations, are only widely popular with Asian and western expatriates. Of these expatriates, only a minority (usually, but not always western) can afford to subscribe to one of the digital networks. Most of the free-to-air terrestrial and satellite Arab channels carry subtitled, or occasionally dubbed, Hollywood movies in addition to Egyptian films and Arab programming. Aloofy’s content study shows that only 7% of the total broadcasts on Gulf stations had a non-Arab source of production (p.64), a proportion of which is heavily censored ‘Hollywood’ films. No exact figures are given for film production shown on television in Aloofy’s study. He does state that of ‘entertainment’ programs (defined as films, soaps, plays, songs, dance and variety shows) only around 5% were non-Arab productions. This figure undermines the cruder versions of the cultural imperialism thesis, which claim that western entertainment dominates international television screens (7). Aloofy’s study would seem to support Tracey’s claim that it is:

‘[...] simply untrue to say that imported television programs, from the U.S. or other metropolitan countries, always have a dominant presence within an indigenous television culture.’ (1985, p.355)

However, the picture, as ever, is not entirely consistent. For example, according to Aloofy: ‘While most entertainment programs were imported from other Arab countries, children’s programs were drawn primarily from the west’ (p.64). Furthermore, Aloofy shows wide discrepancies in percentages of western material shown between, and even within, countries. For instance, in the more ‘conservative’ Sharjah Emirate in the UAE, of total broadcasts, only 4.43% had ‘international’ sources of production, while in its more ‘liberal’ neighbour Dubai this figure was far higher, at 7.64%. Kuwait has nearly three times more ‘international’ productions on its satellite TV station than Sharjah, at 13.17%. Given continuing state involvement in all aspects of domestic television management and production, the role of national policy is clearly a central one.

The importance of the nation state in patrolling the new ‘borderless’ media economy is particularly evident in the unique freedoms allowed the Qatari channel Al Jazeera, which has caused something of a sensation in Middle Eastern broadcasting:

‘Its interviews with dissidents, lively debates between government and opposition, and impartial news reports captured the attention of millions of viewers. According to analysts, offshore broadcasting will soon become the most important source of uncensored information. According to available statistics, large numbers of viewers in Arab countries have already stopped watching the largely anodyne local news reports on terrestrial stations, now that they have become accustomed to controversial news reporting and debate.’ (Taylor, 1999, p.39)

Al Jazeera’s frank news coverage, provocative debates and documentaries have caused diplomatic rifts between Qatar and many other Arab nations including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia. Saudi-dominated advertising agencies have tried to discourage advertising on the channel, which may force Qatari authorities to find funds to keep the station afloat, thus compromising its 'independence’ (see Paris, 2000). From my conversations with students, the station now plays a crucial role in broadening the terms of permitted debate in the region. It is regarded as far more popular and important than the traditionally dominant news outlets, such as Saudi Arabia’s MBC, London-based ANN or English language news channels like CNN. (8) The example of Jazeera, which has provoked widespread international comment (Owen 2000, Hirst 2000, Forrester 1998, 1999, 2000), shows how satellite television can bring profound changes to the political culture of the region. It also illustrates the importance of media policies at a national and regional level, (see also Man Chan, 1994) although these are likely to be overtaken, as Aloofy (1998) remarks, by technological advances in DBS TV in the near future.

How do industry figures respond to the widespread belief that western satellite broadcasters are having a significant effect on the culture of the region? This question was put to representatives from both Star Select and Orbit (separate companies that share the same satellite platform and decoder, and have formed a strategic partnership in the area) in a ‘Gulf News’ report on 10^th December 1999:

Q: ‘So has the exposure to satellite –television affected the way of life in this part of the world?’

A: ‘It has given people of this region a much better view of the world. It has made them aware of what is happening out there,’ says Samer Karanaan [General manager, Orbit].

A: ‘Television plays only a minor role. Don’t forget that a Iot of information is transmitted not just through TV but newspapers, the Internet and magazines. Moreover, a large number of GCC residents travel abroad. So they are impacted as much or probably more by going on holiday to London or Paris than by what we import via television,’ says Roy Duke [Vice President, Advertising Sales, Star TV] (p.74-5).

Accusations of satellite TV’s pernicious effects on the local culture are refuted by other network representatives, by drawing on the western concept of ‘personal (consumer) choice’:

‘ "People are not forced to watch the programmes. Moreover, they are mature enough to decide what is right and what is not," says Ali Ajouz, Marketing Director, Showtime. "We are a pay TV network, people have to make a conscious decision. People can control what they should or should not watch." ‘ (Mohsin Akhtar, 1999, p.75)

What exact effects on culture and identity are believed to be occurring as a result of western media flows? In Man Chan’s (1994) analysis of Star TV’s impact on the wider Asian region (which includes Gulf countries) he notes that in addition to western broadcasts, the blending of western program formats with regional elements is resulting in a degree of cultural homogenisation, at a global and regional (i.e. Asian) level. This threat of cultural erosion and homogenisation seems to be a widespread fear in both Asia and the Middle East. In a local newspaper report about Egypt it claimed:

‘Many Egyptians worry that the creeping influence of the West threatens to undermine their nation’s cultural mores. They point to Western popular culture and its TV shows, films and literature that transmit images forbidden in Islamic society – images of drug abuse, alcoholism, vulgar language and promiscuity. Many in the Egyptian elite have adopted largely Western lifestyles, wearing the latest pair of U.S.-made bluejeans, listening to gangsta rap and having a burger and fries at a local McDonald’s. Less affluent Egyptians have become more conservative, stressing religious instruction for their children and insisting that their wives and daughters wear the hijab, or head scarf.’ (Khalid, 1999, p.7)

Rampant consumerism is widely regarded as one effect of western media influence in this region, a belief in line with the media imperialism arguments of Fredrick Schiller, Dallas Smythe and others. Eltahawy (1999) reports in the Guardian how ‘skimpily dressed Barbie’ dolls promoted heavily on satellite TV are thought by some Islamic scholars to be able to ‘warp children’. There are fears that the Islamic holy month of Ramadan and Eid are being corrupted by consumerism. Duraid Al Baik (1999) asks: ‘is the spiritual message of Ramadan, the ninth month of the Islamic year, being drowned out by the sound of ringing cash tills and the chattering of credit card payment machines?’ He fears that, like Christmas, which ‘has been largely smothered by commercialism’ the religious significance of Ramadan, and the Eid celebrations which follow it, is in conflict with forces of materialism.

The media are frequently accused of promoting materialism and values that are ‘alien to Islamic culture’. Direct evidence for growing consumerism, linked to Hollywood films, comes from Gulf marketing experts, such as Karen Thomas who describe the boom in ‘licensing’ (products associated with movies, cartoons and television programmes). She explains how licensing is still a very young industry in the Middle East, but that Disney, the region’s largest licensing player (holding a market share of more than 70 percent), is thought to generate $60 million a year from retail in the region:

‘Regional licensing income is said to be growing at about 400 percent a year and insiders predict that the market will grow faster than any other region bar Eastern Europe in the next five years.’ Character licensing, a $110 billion industry, ‘is increasing at a dramatic rate in the Middle East.’ (p.27)

The media corporations are forging links with the giant regional ‘shopping festivals’ that draw tourists from as far afield as Europe. The Gulf News for example reported that ‘Disney on Ice’ was entertaining more than 10,000 visitors per day at the Dubai Shopping Festival 2000 (26^th January 2000). This ties in with concerns expressed by Al Baik (1999) and others, that children are being aggressively targeted by western media companies. This opinion seems to be supported by a view from the ‘corporate world’:

‘If proof were needed that the market is ripe for expansion, Warner Bros. Consumer Products is poised for aggressive expansion into the region this year. The first quarter of 1998 sees it launch its first two branded stores in the region, the first in Jeddah and a second in Dubai." (Thomas, Gulf Marketing Review, February 1998, p.28)

Further evidence of growing consumerism in the Gulf area is provided by local-based marketing and advertising firms, who celebrate this phenomenon in various commercial publications. The interlinked nature of western media interests described by Herman and McChesney (1997) is given credence by the following quotation about the popularity of western music, typical of sentiments expressed in relation to a range of products in the local business supplements:

‘ "It’s the invasion of satellite TV and the explosion of FM stations in the UAE that’s helped to popularise music in the region. A customer today has a much higher level of awareness through this airplay and as a result, has a better idea of what he/she wants before walking into a retail outlet." (Charmaine Aranjo, Product Manager, Intemational Audio Division, Megastar quoted by Bharucha, 2000, p.1)

It is not just consumer behaviour, but dress codes, hair styles, musical tastes, manners, morals, sexual behaviour and religious practices which journalists, academics and the students I interviewed believe are altering due to western film imports. In fact, separating the effects of ‘Hollywood’ from a wider western cultural package is a key challenge of this research; but, ultimately, such a separation cannot be made. For instance, a specific negative effect frequently laid at the door of Hollywood is the promotion of ‘sexual degeneracy’, a charge levelled by many students in the research conducted. Yet, this effect is seen to come not only from Hollywood, but also from general western and even Arabic television ‘standards’. In a savage complaint about coverage by Arabic news organisations of the Clinton-Lewinski debacle a member of the Saudi Arabian Consultative Council, Dr Ahmad Bin Muhammad al-Dhabib, criticised Arab satellite broadcasters for covering issues which he described as alien to Islamic culture:

‘After having been "rained upon" by the clouds of Arab satellite transmission and overwhelmed by its frequencies and waves, we have discovered a stunning and bitter fact: namely the danger that we thought was coming from abroad has exploded from under our feet. The danger that we thought was coming from the culturally arrogant West ultimately came from our own people. Instead of adopting a unified Arab position on this issue, we have reached a situation where we are facing up to the West and a part of our own people who are adopting the same line. The result is that the Western media does not need to produce costly programmes that express its values and civilisation and beam them to us. Our Arab satellite stations and mass media are acting on behalf of the West to beam so efficiently the contaminated ideas produced in the West.’ (BBC, 1998, p.2)

Western media, particularly satellite television and films, are often described as ‘hostile’ to Islamic and Arab society (Al Harib, 1998). According to the Gulf News in the UAE ‘there have been growing calls for a firmer political counter to the negative fallout of satellite TV’ (Oct 21^st).

In particular, the constant stream of western films that stereotype Arab and Islamic people have united academics, journalists and viewers in dismay. It is an extraordinary fact that many of these films are released in the Gulf region, even when, as in the case of ‘True Lies’ (1994), ‘The Siege’ (1998) and particularly ‘Rules of Engagement’ (2000), they contain blatant and offensive caricatures of Arab and Islamic people.

Jack Shaheen in ‘The Hollywood Arab’ discusses images in twenty one motion pictures and finds reoccurring stereotypes of Arabs as ‘fabulously wealthy’, barbaric and uncultured’, ‘sex maniacs’ and ‘fanatic terrorists who coldly murder innocent victims’. He quotes Douglas Kellner and Michael Ryan who write that ‘Arabs are serving as the new villain stereotypes in Hollywood films’ (9). This view is supported by Greta Little’s study ‘Representing Arabs: Reliance on the Past’ where she finds five common stereotypes which have been recycled historically in western depictions. These are of Arabs as ‘dirty and lazy’; as ‘ignorant, superstitious and silly’; as ‘irrational, cruel and violent’; as ‘mistreating women’; and as ‘hating Christians and engaging in the slave trade’ (p.264-6).

These finding are reflected in Shaheen’s study of Hollywood images of Arabs. He concludes his study by arguing that the Arab image in the post-1970s Hollywood cinema appears to parallel the image of the Jew in pre-Nazi Germany. Then the Jew was made the scapegoat for `Germany’s pre-war problems. Today, the "Arab demon" lurks behind misfortune, evil, and unbalance in economic and cultural life’. (Shaheen, 1987, p.156) He also quotes filmmaker Mousafa Akkad:

’ "I have never seen a smiling Arab on the screen, a sincere smiling Arab, a loving Arab, never!" he adds: "If he is smiling, it is only out of conniving, plotting, or murderous reasons and these images have obviously affected the [American] people by fuelling their prejudice." ‘(Shaheen, 1987, p.157)

Moreover, the situation appears to be worsening. Hussein Ibish, a spokesman for the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee describes this year’s ‘Rules of Engagement’ as probably the most racist film ever made against Arabs by Hollywood’ (Whitaker, 2000, p14) With the original (fictional) story set in Latin America, Paramount have refused to explain why they switched locations to Yemen, but concerns about offending the US’s 31 million Hispanic citizens are thought to play a part in the decision. A second factor is that Hollywood is slowly running out of races and nationalities that it can ‘afford’ to stereotype:

‘According to Godfrey Cheshire, a critic on the New York Press "the only vicious racial stereotype that’s not only still permitted but – actively endorsed by Hollywood" is that of Arabs as crazed terrorists. In the early days of film, Arabs were over-sexed exotic creatures. By the 1970s, a new stereotype had emerged: the oil sheikh – rich, vengeful, corrupt, sneaky and, above all, fat. According to Mr Ibish, this was simply a recasting of the anti-Semitic Jewish banker stereotype. "From the 1980s onwards Hollywood Arabs have generally been terrorists". Mr Ibish says: "These negative stereotypes are rooted in the very aggressive role that the US plays in the Middle East. The stereotypes emerge from the popular culture which then informs government policy, and that reinforces the willingness of producers of popular culture to promote the stereotypes, and so on. It’s a spiral." (Whitaker, 2000, The Guardian, p.14)

In light of the recent attack on a US ship in Aden, where seventeen US soldiers were killed, it might also be worth asking if such films do not also reinforce antagonisms amongst those nationalities Hollywood chooses to demonise? Certainly scholars such as Wiegand and Malek believe western media may play just such a role. They see US media exports as likely to heighten tensions with the Islamic world:

‘Since Western media dominate the global information society, the media have forced themselves on the Islamic world through satellite television and radio, further disseminating Western culture as well as the West’s perception of the Islamic world. This has been the case with all the developing nations throughout the world, but the Islamic world has been guarding its integrity, and a majority of the people have turned away from Western infiltration. Most Muslims perceive Western society as degraded, with divorce, drugs, promiscuity, and alcoholism prominently displayed to them through the media and entertainment, just as the West has emphasised negative components of Islamic society. There has been an ever-increasing possibility for a collision between such diametrically opposed cultures..’ (Wiegand and Malek 1997, p.209)

There are other questions for which there is no space to outline the contextual background, but which emerge as important issues amongst the students I talked to. These include the impact of western media forms on families, communities and traditions; the role of further education and English language training in the motivation to watch, and ‘decoding’ of Hollywood films; and the possibility of ‘split identity’ reading formations in relation to western films.

Until July of 1999 I worked as an English language teacher in a female teacher training college in Ibri in the 'Interior' of Oman. From September 1999, I have been doing a similar job in a male technical college in the United Arab Emirates 150 km to the north of Ibri. This employment, and my residence in Gulf countries, has granted me a privileged position to be able to investigate how Omanis and Emiratis feel about some of these issues and carry out a more genuinely 'ethnographic' study of specific audiences, than would be possible for other researchers not in day-to-day contact with their intended subjects. In this respect I have had the opportunity to carry out what Mary Gillespie (1995) describes as true 'ethnographic fieldwork':

'characterised by a multiplicity of data-gathering strategies, in a variety of contexts, drawing upon the experiences of a wide range of people over a long period of time.’ (p. 60).

I have investigated the broad theme of ‘Arab identity’ in relation to western films; and, to a lesser extent, gender-orientated usage and readings of film texts. My wife who is working simultaneously at a female technical college in the same town has been able to carry out a limited comparative study in an attempt to discover how 'gender-determined' attitudes to, and choices of, western films might be. This has been interesting, as age, educational (and possibly class) variables are substantially reduced by the selection procedures of the twin colleges. This narrower approach to establishing attitudes (than interviewing a broad cross section of society) is described as 'purposive sampling' by Hartmann. He argues that:

'..it may be neither necessary nor desirable that samples should be representative. The object may simply be to test a particular hypothesis or to make comparisons between different groups' (1987, p.16)

Another advantage of this method is that a smaller number of respondents could be questioned in more detail, as certain key variables (age and education) were fairly consistent. This resulted in a 'narrower' but 'deeper' exploration of attitudes than could be expected from a conventional representative sample of the public.

The research began with informal conversations with individuals and small groups where I was able to explore precisely which issues and topics students were concerned about, within the broad areas outlined, and to assess how (if at all) they were prepared to talk about them. In the exploratory talks the main aims were establishing 'trust', attempting to measure which subjects were of interest to the students and gauge 'off-limit areas', and observing the dynamics of group discussion versus personal interviews. These interviews were followed by two questionnaires, one (of 100 students) to confirm levels of viewing and establish attitudes to western material transmitted by satellite, another (of 40 students) to further investigate popular films, genres, viewing patterns and to explore in more detail commonly expressed concerns.

It is important to note that the data collected was based on small numbers of respondents by social science standards – from which few reliable statistics could be gained, but which provided highly descriptive data. As Dickinson notes this type of ‘qualitative data’, typical of ethnographic research, is subject to problems of reliability - although it may offer ‘a more valid means of researching audience behaviour than any other’ (2000, p.5).

My work as an English teacher required establishing rapport with groups and stimulating discussion among participants, which according to Hansen are key attributes of a 'successful moderator' (1998, p. 273). Furthermore, as I was in close contact with groups for up to ten months, with the opportunity to ask for written feedback or other forms of input at various times, and so I have had the chance to put into practice certain aspects of ethnographic audience methods which:

'..extend the period of contact between researcher and informants and greatly expand the occasions for data gathering and the types of data that are collected.' (Seiter, 1996, p.105)

As in Silverstone, Morley and Hirsch's study of household use of communication and I.T. technology (1990) I attempted to 'triangulate' my research findings by approaching the same research questions through different research methods. These methods included informal, unrecorded private discussions, formal taped group discussions, questionnaires with (and without) follow-up interviews, mini-surveys, worksheets, projects and screenings. By covering the broad area of research from different angles I hoped to be able to provide a more complex picture of Arabic usage of, and attitudes to, western films.

In an attempt to ensure that my own (western) theoretical preconceptions did not weigh too heavily on the study I set up two additional means of investigation that were framed somewhat differently from conventional data gathering procedures. In the first I set up ‘practice speaking exams’ modelled on internal exam procedures for the college. Students in pairs were given a ‘scenario’, which was ‘at the video store’, using a number of colour photocopies of video covers for well-known Hollywood films (available in the college library). They were encouraged to engage in conversation to decide on a film, then they were asked to describe the covers, and finally they were asked to talk about their own film-watching habits (see appendix, case study 2). The level of the student’s English was quite weak (‘pre-intermediate level’) but a number of interesting issues emerged from the transcripts, which I have included (case study 2.2).

In a second exercise I asked five students with a much higher level of English (upper-intermediate) to prepare their own questionnaires on the topic of Hollywood films. This followed a brainstorming session of some of the issues (where my own comments and suggestions probably played a part). The five students typed up their own questions and then these were combined into a single questionnaire which they then used with sixty respondents. At the end of this the students wrote separate reports and did some quite detailed statistical analysis. The survey remains fairly small but indicates some general tendencies that are confirmed by my own surveys and questionnaires.

In conclusion, from my review of the existing literature what seems to be lacking is a focussed study of the quite considerable western (predominantly US) film and video consumption by indigenous populations in the Arabian Gulf. Such studies may exist in Arabic, but extensive searches failed to produce any substantial published research in this area in English (10). There have been studies on television production and usage (such as that by Sreberny-Mohammadi 1998) but these studies have often concentrated on the production context or audience readings of Arabic broadcasting. The 'gaps in the literature' appears around Arabic attitudes to and usage/'readings' of western/Hollywood film texts. This is the area my research addresses.